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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* 
DIANE R. DAUTEL, 
* Case No. 940130-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
* Priority No. 15 
vs. 
* 
DAVID F. DAUTEL, 
* 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), Amended 1992, pertaining to Appeals from 
District Courts involving domestic relations cases. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The matter below is a divorce action and this Appeal is from 
the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation 
or the Decree of Divorce entered on the Stipulation September 17, 
1993. The basis of Plaintiff's Motion to set aside the 
Stipulation presented in open Court, on the record, by her 
1 
attorney, agreed to by each party and approved by the Court, is her 
claim that her thinking was impaired due to medication (Xanax) she 
had taken. The medication was prescribed by her doctor, Dr. 
Wilson, which she had been taking since October, 1991. 
(T. Vol. II 60) The Court, the Honorable Robert L. Newey, 
denied Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation or Decree of 
Divorce entered on the Stipulation after a thorough review of the 
transcript of the proceedings held April 28, 1993 (Stipulation) and 
the evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's Motion, December 20, 1993 
and concluded December 28, 1993, finding, "that Diane Dautel, 
(Plaintiff) was alert, appeared to understand the terms of the 
agreement and her testimony was clear and concise on April 28, 
1993," at the time the stipulation was presented, agreed to and she 
gave testimony. (T. Vol. IV 728) 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial Court abuse its discretion in denying 
Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(1) Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation or 
the Decree of Divorce entered on the parties Stipulation? Birch v. 
Birch, 777 P.2d 1114 (Ut. C. App. 1989). See also Goodmansen v. 
Liberty Vending Systems, 227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 64 (Ut. C. App. 1993) ; 
Warren v. Dickson Ranch Company, 123 Ut. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on this Appeal is an abuse of 
discretion standard. The trial Court has broad discretion in 
ruling on a Motion for Relief from a Judgment or Order under Rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Appellate Court should review the factual findings of the 
trial Judge under the "clearly erroneous standard." The trial 
Court's Findings of Facts should not be disturbed unless such 
findings are clearly erroneous. Findings of Fact will be regarded 
as clearly erroneous only if they are "so lacking in support as to 
be against the clear weight of the evidence." Hagan v. Hagan, 810 
P.2d 478 (Ut. C. App. 1991); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Ut. C. App. 1989); In re the Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Ut. 1989). Appellant must first marshall the evidence which 
supports the finding and then demonstrate that, despite this 
evidence, it is clearly erroneous. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P. 2d 
69, 73 (Ut. App. 1991) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an Appeal from the trial Court's denial of Plaintiff's 
Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation, or the Decree of Divorce 
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entered on the Stipulation of the parties, presented in open Court, 
on the record, agreed to by each party separately and approved by 
the Court. 
PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiff, (wife) filed this divorce action on or about 
January 8, 1992, (R. 1) after the parties had participated in 
marriage counseling prior to August, 1991 with Kurt B. Thorn, a 
clinical psychologist. (T. Vol. II 325) Mr. Thorn at that time 
had only been licensed approximately eight (8) months. (T. Vol. II 
324; 351) Defendant was not represented by counsel at the time the 
action was commenced. He voluntarily entered his appearance by 
signing an Acceptance of Service, Consent and Appearance (R. 10). 
The parties negotiated from January to April, 1992, when 
Plaintiff's attorney filed a Default Certificate, without notice to 
Defendant, after he declined to sign a Stipulation prepared by 
Plaintiff and her attorney. (R. 12; 20-25; 29) Defendant was 
required to seek the aid of an attorney to have the Default 
Certificate set aside, after Plaintiff first agreed to, and then 
subsequently refused Defendant's request to voluntarily vacate the 
Default Certificate. (R. 20-24) At the hearing on Defendant's 
Motion, Plaintiff agreed to set aside the Default Certificate at 
the suggestion and urging of the Domestic Relations Commissioner. 
(R. 47) From this point throughout the proceedings, Plaintiff 
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displayed a vindictive and uncooperative attitude toward Defendant. 
(R. 160-162) (T. Vol. Ill 664; 674, L-21) 
From April, 1992, to January, 1993, Defendant made several 
attempts personally and through his attorney, to engage in 
settlement negotiations which were rejected by Plaintiff, (T. Vol. 
II 247) although she had claimed Defendant was stalling the divorce 
process. (R. 39, par. 5). The divorce action being dormant, a 
Certificate of Readiness was filed August 14, 1992 (R. 49) and a 
Pre-trial Settlement Conference scheduled for September 22, 1992. 
(R. 38) Defendant filed his Financial Declaration form September 
18, 1992, with personal property lists attached, a copy having been 
served on Plaintiff. (R. 60-70) The case was not settled at the 
Pre-trial Settlement Conference (R. 71-73) The date of December 
23, 1992 was available for trial and agreeable to both attorneys. 
However, Plaintiff refused to have the case tried on that date, 
with the excuse that it was her son's 16th birthday. (T. Vol. II 
290) This necessitated the case being certified to Judge Memmot 
for a trial setting in 1993. (R. 72) 
Pursuant to Notice dated March 24, 1993, the case was set for 
trial on April 28, 1993. (R. 100) As the trial date approached, 
Plaintiff's attorney requested that the parties meet on April 27, 
1993, the eve of the trial, and negotiate. Although the parties 
had exchanged settlement proposals in January, 1993, this was the 
first meeting between the parties and their attorneys. (T. Vol. II 
247) . The parties met for approximately 3 1/2 hours and all of 
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the issues of the divorce were discussed, utilizing the January 
settlement proposals. Plaintiff understood and was aware of all 
the issues discussed, negotiated and those agreed upon. (T. Vol. 
II 247-248) 
The parties appeared for trial April 28, 1993. Negotiations 
continued with leave of the Court which resulted in an agreement 
and stipulation on all issues. The stipulation and agreement of 
the parties was presented to the Court, on the record, by 
Plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Lawrence. (T. 106-134 Trial transcript; 
R. 102-105; 206) The Court, Judge Newey, approved and accepted 
the stipulation and settlement agreement, after each of the parties 
had stated their approval and acceptance. (T. 129-130; 131-134, 
Trial transcript) 
Plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Lawrence, prepared proposed Findings 
of Fact and a Decree of Divorce, which were submitted to 
Defendant's attorney, Mr. Fankhauser, for approval. After 
exchange of letters between counsel, the differences in wording of 
the proposed Findings and Decree of Divorced were resolved. Only 
one issue remained to be resolved regarding the 401-K account. 
(See letter July 27, 1993 Addendum) On July 30, 1993, Plaintiff 
filed her Motion to set aside the Stipulation three (3) months and 
two (2) days after the Stipulation had been agreed to, accepted and 
approved by the Court. Plaintiff's Motion, as filed, did not 
indicate it was brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) U.R.C.P. 
(R. 140-142) However, Plaintiff's attorney, at the time of 
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closing argument, represented to the Court that Plaintiff's Motion 
was brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (mistake, inadvertence, 
excusable neglect) (T. Vol, III 681; 708-709) 
Plaintiff filed contemporaneous with the Motion to Set Aside, 
an Order to Show Cause for Contempt and Other Relief which was 
heard August 20, 1993. (R. 144-146). Domestic Relations 
Commissioner Allphin, ruled Defendant was not in arrears in his 
payment of alimony and support and that Plaintifffs Order to Show 
Cause was not appropriately brought to the Court, recommending 
Defendant be awarded attorney's fees. (R. 158-159; 173-175) 
At the Order to Show Cause hearing, August 20, 1993, 
Plaintiff's attorneys had not yet submitted Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce to the Court, although a 
transcript of the proceedings of April 28, 1993 had been prepared 
and filed with the Court. (R. 106-135). Defendant's attorney 
prepared Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce pursuant to the transcript of the parties Stipulation, 
which were signed and entered by the Court September 17, 1993. 
(R. 215-235) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court, the Honorable Judge Newey, after the evidentiary 
hearing on Plaintiff's Motion, which concluded December 28, 1993, 
denied the Plaintiff's Motion based on specific findings set forth 
in the record (T. Vol. IV 728-738). The Court found Plaintiff, 
7 
Diane Dautel, to be alert and appeared to understand the agreement 
when she appeared before the Court on April 28, 1993 at the time 
the Stipulation was entered into and when she specifically 
testified to jurisdiction and other matters necessary to award a 
Decree of Divorce based upon the Stipulation. The denial of 
Plaintiff's Motion was also based upon the Court's finding from the 
evidence presented that Plaintiff had failed to prove mistake, 
inadvertence or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Further, it was the Court's opinion and finding 
the Stipulation of the parties was fair and equitable to both 
parties to the extent the Court's Findings and Decree would not 
substantially vary from the Stipulation the parties entered into. 
(T. Vol. IV 728; 733-734; 735-736). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff's problems of depression and anxiety pre-existed 
for more than five (5) months before she filed her Complaint for 
divorce. Plaintiff was represented by her attorney, Mr. Lawrence, 
throughout the entire proceedings. Prior to filing the divorce 
Complaint, the parties had engaged in marriage counseling with Kurt 
B. Thorn, a licensed clinical psychologist, who testified 
Plaintiff's anxiety increased after separation. (T. Vol. II, 325; 
328-329) . 
2. Dr. Wilson, Plaintiff's physician, on or about October 29, 
1991, pursuant to telephone calls from Mr. Thorn and the Plaintiff, 
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without actually seeing or examining her, prescribed Xanax for her 
anxiety problem. The prescribed dosage was .5 milligrams every 8 
hours as needed, a total of 1.5 milligrams per day. (T. Vol. II 
305-306) Prozac was not prescribed until November 12, 1991. Dr. 
Wilson, on or about February 19, 1992, increased the prescribed 
dosage of Prozac from one 2 0 milligram tablet per day to two 2 0 
milligram tablets per day. At the same time, he increased 
Plaintiff's prescribed dosage of Xanax to 8 pills .5 milligrams 
each, for a total of 4 milligrams daily. (T. Vol. II 294-295) 
3. Mr. Thorn, Plaintiff's psychologist, testified his focus 
was on Plaintiff's depression. He vaguely remembered calling Dr. 
Wilson to recommend some anti-depressant medication for Plaintiff. 
He did not recommend anything for anxiety. This testimony is in 
conflict with Dr. Wilson's testimony. (T. Vol. II 326) Although 
Mr. Thorn continued counselling Plaintiff, seeing her "fairly 
regularly," he was unaware of Plaintiff's prescribed use of Xanax 
for anxiety until late April, 1993, somewhere around April 19th. 
(T. Vol. II 326-328) During this period of continuing 
counselling, up to April 19, 1993, he did not observe that 
Plaintiff experienced any side effects from taking Xanax or any 
change in her behavior. (T. Vol. II 332-333) 
4. During the period Plaintiff was taking Xanax and Prozac, 
Dr. Wilson examined and tested Plaintiff to determine if she was 
experiencing side effects from the medication, the first March 26, 
1992 and again March 17, 1993, approximately one month before the 
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trial of April 28, 1993. The tests were normal, with no evidence 
of side effects and her condition with regard to depression and 
anxiety had actually improved from the time he had increased her 
prescribed dosage of Xanax to 4 milligrams a day (T. Vol. II 306-
308). Dr. Wilson also testified, because of Plaintiff's age, she 
would be less susceptible to side effects of impairment from Xanax; 
(T. Vol. II 300-301) that she was responding to the medication 
(Xanax) the way he wanted her to. He felt she was able to 
function at the same time her depression and anxiety was controlled 
with her gastrointestinal problems. (T. Vol. II 301-303) 
5. Dr. Wilson testified that the effects of Xanax was 
different and varies with each individual person, and in cases of 
severe anxiety, they may perform better. (T. Vol. II 297). The 
first complaint he received from Plaintiff that she was not able to 
carry out her work at home from taking Xanax was on or about August 
19, 1993, approximately four (4) months after the Court proceedings 
of April 28, 1993 and five (5) months after the examination of 
March 17, 1993. (T. Vol. II 316-317). 
6. The testimony of Mr. Thorn, quoted in Plaintiff's Brief at 
the top of page 7 concerning his belief as to Plaintiff's trouble 
with being assertive, relates to her condition at the time of the 
parties separation, August, 1991, not the time of trial, April, 
1993, and before Xanax was prescribed. Mr. Thorn testified that 
Plaintiff's periods of confusion and being indecisive were symptoms 
of the depression and anxiety she was experiencing at that time, 
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August, 1991. (T. Vol. II 328-330) Plaintiff's difficulty in 
making correct decisions was due to her indecisive personality 
disorder, not the medications. The drug, Xanax, was first 
prescribed September 27, 1991, and Prozac November 12, 1991. (T. 
Vol. II 293) Dr. Wilson testified, with Xanax, Plaintiff's 
anxiety condition was under control, had actually improved and she 
was able to function. (T. Vol. II 302; 308) He also testified 
that confusion and impaired thinking is not necessarily related to 
the quantity of Xanax taken. (T. Vol II 303). 
7. Plaintiff was not seen or observed by Dr. Wilson or Mr. 
Thorn the day before trial and the morning of April 28, 1993. The 
Court, Judge Newey, listened to and observed the Plaintiff 
throughout the entire proceedings of that morning and again the 
entire proceedings held December 20, 1993 and December 28, 1993. 
Plaintiff's parents drove Plaintiff to Court the morning of April 
28, 1993 and were present in Court during the entire proceedings, 
but did not testify concerning Plaintiff's condition at the hearing 
on her Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation. (T. Vol. II 260-261) 
Other relatives of Plaintiff were present in the Court room on 
April 28, 1993 and they likewise did not testify concerning 
Plaintiff's condition and at the hearing on her Motion to Set Aside 
the Stipulation. 
8. Defendant refuted and denied Plaintiff's claims that he 
harassed her constantly for two (2) weeks prior to the trial, April 
28, 1993. Defendant, during the pendency of the divorce action 
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suffered from anxiety, stress and depression due to Plaintiff's 
hateful attitude toward him and her complete lack of cooperation. 
During the pendency of the action Defendant was taking prescribed 
medications for his depression and anxiety, taking 40 milligrams of 
Prozac and 50 milligrams of Trazodone daily. At the hearing April 
28, 1993, Defendant conversed with Plaintiff, observed her demeanor 
and heard her responses to inquiries of Judge Newey and her 
attorney. Based on his personal knowledge of Plaintiff gained 
during the marriage, he stated, she was completely coherent, 
responsive and not impaired physically, mentally or emotionally. 
She did not act abnormal in any way. (R. 160-162) 
9. The Plaintiff's testimony regarding her taking Xanax was 
in conflict with her Affidavit and the Affidavit of Dr. Wilson 
filed with her Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation, in the 
following particulars: 
(a) Dr. Wilson at paragraph 4 of his Affidavit states 
that Plaintiff increased the dosage beyond that which had 
been prescribed. He stated, based on her (Diane's) 
representations, he learned she was taking 3 milligrams per 
day of Xanax. At paragraph 5 of his Affidavit, he gives an 
opinion that 3 milligrams of Xanax per day would seriously 
impede a persons's thinking and cognitive processes. 
(R. 148) In contrast, Dr. Wilson testified from his medical 
records at the hearing December 20, 1993, that he increased 
her prescribed dosage of Xanax on February 19, 1992 and told 
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her that she should take up to 8 pills of .5 milligrams each 
a day. This would be 4 milligrams per day, 1 milligram more 
than the 3 milligrams per day stated in his Affidavit. On 
March 17, 1993 he found her to be improved and free of side 
effects. 
(b) Plaintiff, Diane Dautel, stated at paragraph 2 of 
her Affidavit that her physician (Dr. Wilson) prescribed 
.5 milligrams of Xanax per 12 hour period. Dr. Wilson 
testified that her initial prescribed dosage of Xanax in 
September, 1991, was one .5 milligram pill every 8 hours, 
1.5 milligrams per day. (T. Vol. II 293) 
(c) Plaintiff, Diane Dautel, at paragraph 3 of her 
Affidavit, stated that for a period of two (2) weeks prior 
to the April 28, 1993 hearing, she increased her dosage of 
Xanax to 3 milligrams per day. (R. 129-140) This was at a 
time that her prescribed dosage was up to 4 milligrams per 
day as stated by Dr. Wilson; (T. Vol. II 295) and she had 
been taking a prescribed dosage of .5 milligrams to 1.0 
milligrams 4 times a day (T. Vol. II 302-303) ; and could take 
up to eight .5 milligram pills a day from February, 1992 to 
the date of hearing, April 28, 1993, with no claim of 
impairment. 
(d) Plaintiff, Diane Dautel, in her Affidavit at 
paragraph 3, stated that she took 1. milligram of Xanax the 
night of April 27, 1993 before going to bed and 1. milligram 
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during the night. In anticipation of the stress and 
anxiety of the trial, she took 1. milligram of Xanax the 
morning of April 28, 1993. It should be noted that her 
Affidavit is dated July 30, 1993. (R. 140) Plaintiff later 
testified at the hearing on her Motion to Set Aside the 
Stipulation under questioning of the Court, that she took 
1.5 milligrams (3 pills) before going to bed the evening of 
April 27, 1993, her friend gave her one more pill at 
approximately 10:30 P.M. (.5 milligrams) and then at 1:30 
P.M. the morning of April 28, 1993, she took one pill 
(.5 milligrams) and then claimed that she took 3 pills the 
morning of April 28, 1993 before the trial hearing (1.5 
milligrams) (T. Vol. I 573; 599-602) 
(e) Plaintiff, in her Affidavit of July 30, 1993, 
did not state that she took Prozac the morning of April 
28, 1993. However, she testified on December 20, 1993 
that she took 1 regular Prozac. (T. Vol. I 573). This 
statement was in conflict with and contrary to her 
testimony that she took Prozac at night when she went to 
bed. (T. Vol. II 262) Plaintiff testified and Exhibit 
D-l verified that the last prescription filled for Xanax 
before the April 28, 1993 hearing was on March 28, 1993 
and consisted of 30 pills .5 milligrams each. Although 
Plaintiff claimed and testified that she was in the process 
of stock piling Xanax, she did not know how many pills she 
14 
had on March 28 or April 27, 1993. (T. Vol. I 597) Based 
on Plaintiff's testimony and her Affidavit that she was 
taking 2 pills a day, 1 every 12 hours, up until approximately 
2 weeks before trial, and then increased her dosage to 3 pills 
a day or more, she would have exceeded her last prescription 
of 30 pills by 12 to 15 pills. (T. Vol. I 570; 591; 593-595; 
597-598). The Court, Judge Newey, found from the evidence, 
that Plaintiff's taking of Xanax the evening of April 27th 
and the morning of April 28, 1993, did not exceed the 
dosage prescribed by Dr. Wilson of 2 tablets of Xanax each 
6 hours or 8 tablets per day. (T. Vol. IV 734-735). 
10. Plaintiff understood and was cognizant of the issues 
discussed and agreed to during the meeting of April 27, 1993 of 
custody, visitation, child support, the income of the parties, 
debts, division of real property and alimony. (T. Vol. II 247-249) 
Contrary to the claims of Plaintiff, the Court found this meeting 
lasted approximately 3.5 hours. (T. Vol. IV 728; R. 166) 
Plaintiff does not claim that her thinking and decision processes 
were impaired at any time during this meeting, although she said 
she had taken 3 pills of Xanax prior to the meeting (1.5 
milligrams) (T. Vol. I 603) 
11. Plaintiff is and has been self employed, working out of 
the home, doing nails. She does not report all of her income. At 
the April 27, 1993 negotiating meeting, she agreed that her actual 
income was more than minimum wage. That $800.00 per month income 
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would be imputed to her for support calculations and alimony, even 
though she had stated her income to be less at the time of the 
Temporary Order and in her financial declaration. (T. Vol. II 248-
249) (R. 51; 74; 166) 
12. The Trial Court on the morning of the trial, was advised 
that there were 2 or 3 issues remaining to be agreed upon and 
granted additional time to the parties and their attorneys, at 
their request, to negotiate further to see if they could reach an 
agreement on these issues, which they did. (T. Vol. IV 728) 
Plaintiff first admitted and then later denied this fact. (T. Vol. 
I 575; 578) Plaintiff understood and was cognizant of all of the 
terms of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement at the time it 
was presented to the Court by her attorney, Mr. Lawrence. (T. Vol. 
II 249-259; 263-265). 
13. The Court, Judge Newey, at the time of the hearing on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation, had reviewed the 
transcript of the April 28, 1993 hearing and recalled the questions 
which he posed directly to the Plaintiff at that time concerning 
her understanding of the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement. 
(T. Vol. II 265-258). Judge Newey, before rendering his decision, 
reviewed the personal property lists (Exhibit P-l), the photographs 
of Defendant's electrical equipment (Exhibits D-3, D-4), 
Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories and Admissions (Exhibit P-
2) , the parties Financial Declarations and payments made by 
Defendant for the benefit of Plaintiff as a credit against alimony. 
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(T. Vol. IV 728, 730). 
14. On July 30, 1993, approximately 3 months after the April 
28, 1993 hearing, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Set Aside the 
Stipulation because she felt her attorney, Mr. Lawrence, had let 
her down when he advised her to compromise and agree to the issues 
that remained in dispute concerning the disparity in division of 
personal property, the 401-K account and compromise of money claims 
for alimony arrearage against debts paid by the Defendant. 
(T. Vol. II 255; 265) (T. Vol I 576) (T. Vol. Ill 666-673; 
690-694) 
RULING 
15. The Court, Judge Newey, having observed the Plaintiff 
throughout the hearing on her Motion and after careful review of 
the testimony, exhibits and transcript of the April 28, 1993 
hearing, denied Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation or 
the Decree of Divorce, based on his finding that the Plaintiff, 
Diane Dautel, to be alert, that her testimony was clear and concise 
when she appeared before the Court on April 28, 1993. The finding 
that Plaintiff, Diane Dautel, on the morning of the trial, appeared 
to act and respond normally to the Court's questions, was able to 
articulate and respond accurately to the Court's specific questions 
relating to the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and her 
agreement to the Stipulation. (T. Vol. IV 728-733) The Court 
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also found, after review of the property lists and evidence 
presented, the Stipulation of the parties was fair and equitable to 
both parties and that Plaintiff had failed to prove mistake, 
inadvertence or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (T. Vol. IV 735-736). 
ERRORS IN PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
16. The testimony of Mr. Thorn, quoted at page 7 of 
Plaintiff's Brief, pertains to events and circumstances that 
occurred between the parties separation, August 19, 1991 and the 
filing of the Divorce Complaint by Plaintiff, January, 1992, as 
opposed to the two (2) week period before the trial hearing of 
April 28, 1993, indicated by Plaintiff. 
Defendant, David Dautel, did not enter the home or remove 
personal property after January, 1992. The statements referenced 
in Plaintiff's Brief that he entered the home and removed personal 
property again pertains to the period September, 1991 to January, 
1992, not the two (2) week period before April 28, 1993. (T. Vol. 
Ill 665; 669) 
Plaintiff's assertion at the top of page 12 of her Brief, 
Statement of Facts, that the trial Court should have used a 
"criminal law" inquiry before accepting the parties Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement in a civil proceeding is without legal basis. 
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NOTICE OF DUPLICATION OF RECORD 
In an effort to avoid confusion and assist the Court with 
regard to the transcript of the proceedings held December 20th and 
concluded December 28, 1993, there is a duplication of Volume II of 
the transcript of the proceedings held December 20, 1993 contained 
in the trial Court file II. The original of Volume II is 
designated in the trial Court record as pages 245 to 377. A copy 
of the transcript volume II has been designated in the trial Court 
record as pages 430 to 562. 
Volume I of the transcript of the proceedings held December 
20, 1993 has been designated in the trial Court record as pages 564 
to 606. Transcript Volume I should have been number ahead of 
Volume II. Thus, there may be confusion with regard to references 
to the trial transcript in the Briefs of the respective parties. 
Volume III of the transcript of the proceedings held December 
28, 1993 begins at page 608 of the trial Court record and concludes 
with Volume IV of the transcript of the proceedings December 28, 
1993, pages 725 to 738. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
THE STIPULATION OR DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED ON THE STIPULATION AS 
A RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION WAS NOT ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
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Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation did not 
designate it was brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) U.R.C.P. and did 
not comply with provisions of Rule 7(b)(1) U.R.C.P. (R. 140-142; 
203-204) However, Plaintiff's attorney, near the conclusion of 
the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion and at closing argument, 
represented to the Court that Plaintiff's Motion was brought 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), mistake, inadvertence, excusable 
neglect. (T. Vol. Ill 681; 708-709) Plaintiff filed her Motion 
to Set Aside the Stipulation on July 30, 1993, more than three (3) 
months after the hearing of April 28, 1993, and therefore was not 
timely. Rule 60(b) requires that Motions for reasons (1), (2), (3) 
or (4) be filed not more than 3 months after the proceedings that 
the stipulation was presented and approved by the Court. 
Plaintiff's Motion, under subdivision (b)(1) being filed more than 
3 months after the Stipulation was entered into, accepted and 
approved by the Court, was untimely and should have been denied. 
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P2d 495 (Ut 1983). 
As a general rule, the trial Court is afforded broad 
discretion in ruling on a Motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), 
mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect and its determination 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. 
Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Ut. C. App. 1989) Plaintiff's attack on the 
trial Court's ruling is a challenge to the Court's Findings of 
Fact. To successfully attack Findings of Fact, Plaintiff, as 
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Appellant, must first marshall all the evidence supporting the 
Findings and then demonstrate that even if viewed in the light most 
favorable to the trial Court, the evidence is legally insufficient 
to support the Findings. Christensen v. Munns, (supra) Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Ut. 1989) citing Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha, Ins. Co. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Ut. 1989) In Re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Ut. 1989). 
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined under Rule 
52(a) U.R.C.P., which provides: "Findings of Fact, whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
"clearly erroneous11 and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial Court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Richens v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co, 817 P.2d 382 
(Ut. C. App. 1991); Doelle v. Bradley (supra). The findings of 
the trial Court and its ruling are supported by the transcript of 
the proceedings of April 28, 1993, the evidence presented at the 
hearing of Plaintiff's Motion, in particular the events which 
occurred the day before, at the same time refuting Plaintiff's 
claim that she was befuddled and unable to make decisions relating 
to her interest at the time the Stipulation was presented and 
approved by her. At the time the Stipulation was presented and 
read into the record by Plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Lawrence, the 
Court, the Honorable Judge Newey, heard and observed each of the 
parties, made inquiries and asked specific questions of them, as 
follows: 
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(1) Mr. Lawrence, at page 3, lines 2 through 9, set 
forth the restriction on visitation regarding the children 
under age 14, requested by Plaintiff and agreed to by 
Defendant. (R. 108) 
(2) The Court, at page 6, lines 22 to 25 and page 
7, line 1, reviewed the child support issue presented by 
Mr. Lawrence and Exhibit D-2 (Support Worksheet) that was 
submitted to the Court with income verification. (R. 111-112) 
(3) The Court, at page 10 of the transcript, lines 
1 through 16, reviewed the Stipulation with regard to the 
equity lien to be awarded Defendant for his share of the 
home equity and the events which would render the lien 
due and payable. Also, Mr. Lawrence, at lines 18 and 19 
stated that Defendant was waiving any claim to a pre-marital 
contribution. 
(4) The Court, at page 12 of the Stipulation, lines 
12 through 15, requested Mr. Lawrence to clarify the 
parties agreement to division of Defendant's ESOP and PAYSOP 
stock shares with his employer, E-Systems. At page 11 
of the transcript, lines 23 through 25, Mr. Lawrence stated 
to the Court that Defendant would be awarded all of the 
ESOP and PAYSOP shares of stock he had acquired before 
marriage. (R. 116-117). 
(5) The Court, at page 13 of the transcript, lines 
8 through 9, asked, "and what does the $7,000.00 represent? 
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His prior marriage interest? Mr. Lawrence responded, 
"no, no, the $7,000.00 is consideration in some transfers 
we have done in regard to personal property." (R. 118) 
With regard to the division of personal property, the Court, 
at page 14 of the transcript, lines 7 through 8, asked Mr. 
Lawrence whether he would furnish an itemization of the 
personal property. Mr. Lawrence responded in the 
affirmative, "that's correct." The Court, being satisfied 
with the response, stated at lines 13 through 15, "alright, 
alright. It won't be necessary then to itemize those for 
the record right now." (R. 119) It should be noted that 
both parties had possession of the personal property lists 
which had been reviewed in detail at the negotiating meeting, 
April 27th and the morning of trial, April 28, 1993. 
(6) The Court, at page 16 of the transcript, lines 
2 through 7, expressly stated that it was trying to avoid 
future misunderstandings with regard to the Stipulation 
and Settlement Agreement. 
(7) Mr. Lawrence, at page 18 of the transcript, lines 
15 through 17, conferred with Plaintiff, off the record, 
about the Stipulation concerning debts and obligations and 
marital debts that would be paid from liquidation and sale 
of the stock that he had just articulated to the Court. 
(R. 12 3) Back on the record, the Court, at page 18 of 
the transcript, lines 22 to 25, and page 19, made inquiry 
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to clarify the parties agreement on the 1992 real property 
taxes. (R. 123-124) 
(8) The Court, at page 19, commencing with lines 19 
through 25, continuing to page 20, asked Plaintiff 
specifically if she understood the Stipulation that had 
been recited to the Court. The following exchange then 
ensued: 
MRS. DAUTEL: I think so. 
THE COURT: And is this your agreement? Is this what 
you want the - - your Divorce Decree to incorporate by way of 
property settlement, alimony and support? 
MRS. DAUTEL: I guess. 
THE COURT: Well - -
MRS. DAUTEL: I am a little iffy on it. 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MRS. DAUTEL: I'm questioning it a little bit, but I 
guess I'll go along with it. 
MR. LAWRENCE: Could I talk to her one second, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Off the record discussion between Mr. Lawrence 
and Mrs. Dautel) 
MR. LAWRENCE: I think she's ready, your Honor. 
THE COURT: We would - - we would need you to 
state if that is your agreement, if that is what you are 
agreeing to at this time; otherwise, why the Court would 
proceed with the trial of the case. 
MRS. DAUTEL: Yes, I will agree with that. 
THE COURT: And that's - - that's what you want to do 
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at this time? 
MRS. DAUTEL: Yes. 
THE COURT: Alright. Then, let me ask the Defendant, 
David Dautel, is that your agreement? 
MR. DAUTEL: Yes, your Honor, it is. (R. 124-126) 
(9) Thereafter, points of clarification and other 
matters were presented to the Court by counsel for the 
respective parties, which are set forth on pages 22 through 
2 3 of the transcript. Judge Newey, at page 23, lines 
20 and 21 of the transcript, specifically inquired of 
Plaintiff's attorney regarding his client's understanding 
of the points of clarification. Judge Newey again, at 
page 24, lines 14 through 21, inquired of both parties 
regarding the stipulated agreement, their understanding 
and approval of the agreement, as follows: 
THE COURT: Very well, now, with these clarifications, 
let me again ask each party if this is your agreement and 
if this is the agreement you want the Divorce Decree entered 
on and incorporated in the Decree. You both understand 
what counsel has said by way of clarification, and this is 
your agreement. Is that correct, Mrs. Dautel? 
MRS. DAUTEL: Yes 
THE COURT: Mr. Dautel? 
MR. DAUTEL: Yes it is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright. The Court believes that through 
great effort on the part of counsel and the parties - -
that's the reason I permitted you extra time, rather than 
starting this morning - - that you have been able to devise 
an agreement that appears to the Court to be fair and 
reasonable under all the circumstances. And I would approve 
your agreement and permit you to incorporate it into the 
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Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
which the Court would sign. And I will permit the Plaintiff 
to proceed at this time, the testimony. (R. 129-130) 
Plaintiff was then called to the stand to testify. She 
was duly sworn and examined by Mr* Lawrence, her attorney. 
At page 26 of the transcript, lines 21 through 25, continuing 
to page 27, lines 1 through 4, affirmed the Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement, as follows: 
Q: And isn't it true that - - isn't it your desire 
that you be awarded a divorce pursuant to the terms set 
forth in the Stipulation that was entered into today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are not opposed to the Defendant 
withdrawing his Answer and allowing this to take place 
pursuant to that Stipulation? 
A. No. (R. 131-132) 
The Court, at page 28 of the transcript, lines 2 
through 7, approved the Stipulation and Agreement and ordered 
it be incorporated in the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce. The Court again, at page 29 of 
the transcript, beginning with line 1, made inquiry concerning 
anything the Court should have covered, without any contrary 
response from the Plaintiff. (R. 133-134) 
Plaintiff has not attempted to marshall the evidence in 
support of the trial Court's findings and demonstrate that the 
evidence supporting the findings is legally insufficient. 
Plaintiff's Brief presents conflicting evidence in a light most 
favorable to her position and largely ignores the contrary 
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evidence. Plaintiff was not seen or observed by Dr. Wilson or Mr. 
Thorn, the day before trial and the morning of April 28, 1993. 
Judge Newey listened to and observed the Plaintiff throughout the 
entire proceedings of April 28th, the entire proceedings held 
December 20 and December 28, 1993. Judge Newey was in the 
advantage position of determining whether the Xanax she had taken 
affected her thought and decision processes negatively. In 
contrast, the testimony of Mr. Thorn and Dr. Wilson was based on 
what the Plaintiff had told them, speculation and not actual 
observation. Dr. Wilson testified that the affect of Xanax was 
different and varied with each individual person, and in cases of 
severe anxiety, they may perform better. (T. Vol. II 297) 
Plaintiff's first complaint that she was not able to function and 
carry out her work from taking Xanax came 4 months after the Court 
proceedings of April 28, 1993 and 5 months after the examination of 
March 17, 1993 without specifics. (T. Vol. II 316-317). 
Plaintiff's Brief presents conflicting evidence in a light 
most favorable to her position and largely ignores the contrary 
evidence. A trial Court's factual finding is deemed "clearly 
erroneous" only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Doelle v. Bradley (supra). The challenged findings are not 
"clearly erroneous" and therefore no abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial Court and its ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion 
should not be disturbed. 
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POINT II 
THE FINDING THAT THE STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT TO BE FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE BY THE TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND NOT 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Plaintiff's claim that the trial Court abused its discretion 
in failing to make or enter specific Findings of Fact, "justifying 
alimony, child support and property awards," is without merit and 
not supported by the record or law. The trial Court was under a 
duty to make a determination on the evidence presented, whether 
there was sufficient basis or reason to set the Stipulation aside 
for "mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect." The Court, on 
Plaintiff's Motion before it, was not required to make factual 
findings on the issues of child support, alimony or property 
awards. As to the issue of child support, at the time the 
Stipulation was presented, child support was represented to be 
according to the Guidelines pursuant to the parties incomes and the 
worksheet presented (Exhibit D-2) in response to the inquiry of the 
Court. (R. 111-112) The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of 
Larson v. Collins, 684 P.2d 52 (Ut. 1984) stated as a general rule: 
Usually, it is not appropriate on subdivision (b) 
Motions to examine the merits of claim decided by the 
default judgment. 
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Irrespective of this Rule, Plaintiff was afforded considerable 
latitude by the trial Court throughout the hearing on her Motion to 
present evidence with regard to these issues. David M. Nielsen, 
an attorney, a witness called by Plaintiff, acknowledged that 
alimony is "always negotiable." (T. Vol. Ill 635) Mr. Nielsen 
acknowledged that he had only seen the file of Plaintiff's 
attorney, delivered to him by Mr. Crist's office, noon the day 
before. (T. Vol. Ill 616; 654) He was not px^ v^ y to the parties 
negotiations. He had not talked with the parties or their 
attorneys regarding their negotiations or the underlying basis for 
the parties agreement. In response to a direct question by Judge 
Newey, to-wit: 
THE COURT: You're not in a position to give a 
professional opinion without having been privy to the hours 
of negotiation in arriving at this settlement, are you? 
MR. NIELSEN: No, I'm not, your honor. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MR. NIELSEN: Each case is differently - - is different 
and we weren't there for the discussions between the attorneys 
and the clients and the attorneys and the attorneys. So all 
we can do is look at the file now to make our - -
THE COURT: Yes 
MR. NIELSEN: - - opinion 
In spite of this response of Mr. Nielsen to the Court's question, 
Judge Newey allowed him to state opinions on the issues which he 
acknowledged were not based on facts of the case. (T. Vol. Ill 
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620-621; 636; 644-645) However, Mr. Nielsen did acknowledge his 
reading of the April 28, 1993 transcript, the care that Judge Newey 
took to make sure the parties understood every aspect of the 
Stipulation. (T. Vol. Ill 641) 
The Court, Judge Newey, made his finding that the Stipulation 
of the parties was fair and equitable to both parties only after he 
had made an indepth review of each party's list of properties and 
values awarded to them, the debts and obligations, the financial 
statements and the evidence presented concerning the property, 
alimony and child support, as if a new trial of the case. 
(T. Vol. IV 736) Under all these circumstances, it cannot be 
said, as Plaintiff asserts, the Court abused its discretion. 
Where a Decree of Divorce is based upon a Property Settlement 
Agreement, negotiated by the parties and sanctioned by the Court, 
equity should not be used as a lever to realign rights and 
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one party has 
come to regret the bargain made. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 
P.2d 56, 61 (Ut. C. App. 1990) quoting Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 
1251 (Ut. 1980) 
Equity is not available to reinstate rights and 
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because 
one has come to regret the bargain made. 
Some of the strongest evidence that Plaintiff was not impaired at 
the trial hearing, April 28, 1993, as claimed, comes from testimony 
of Mr. Thorn, her clinical psychologist. Reading from his 
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clinical notes made at a counselling session with Plaintiff on or 
about July 9, 1993, some 3 months after she entered into the 
Stipulation, he testified: 
Diane was upset with the divorce settlement. Victor 
seemed to have washed out in Court and totally conceded to 
Dave's attorney. Two boys have become defiant. Diane is 
on Xanax and Prozac. During the Court, currently and prior 
to Court very anxious and depressive. Confused in the 
Court by Victor1s change of attitude and also because of 
anxiety. Probably agreed to Court Decree with - - oh, 
excuse me. Due to anxiety and confusion of her attorney. 
(T. Vol. II 347-348) 
The foregoing is a strong indication that Plaintiff had, subsequent 
to agreeing to the Stipulation in open Court, came to regret the 
bargain made. She was in fact alert, and understood the agreement 
she had entered into with the aid and advise of her attorney. 
Where these circumstances exist, there is an institutional 
hesitancy to relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and 
entered into with the advise of counsel. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons Co. (supra) citing Birch v. Birch (supra). 
The burden of proof with respect to setting aside Divorce 
Decrees based on stipulated settlement agreements is particularly 
high. For example, the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Lea v. 
Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Ut. 1983) held that factual findings 
that the husband was not represented by counsel and had been 
drinking heavily for an extensive period of time, at the time a 
stipulation was entered into which governed the Findings and Decree 
in the original divorce, did not constitute "compelling reasons11 
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for change of circumstances or modification of a Decree of Divorce. 
Also, illness alone is not a sufficient excuse to make neglect for 
vacating a default judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. 12 3 Ut. 
416, 260 P. 2d 741 (1953) Where the findings of the trial Court in 
its ruling are supported by the transcript of the proceedings of 
April 28, 1993, the evidence presented at the hearing of 
Plaintiff's Motion, Plaintiff has failed to meet the required 
burden of proof to establish abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing abuse of 
discretion by a clear preponderance under the clearly erroneous 
standard in that the findings and ruling of the trial Court are 
supported by the clear weight of the evidence. The denial of 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation should be affirmed. 
Equity is not available to Plaintiff to reinstate rights and 
privileges voluntarily contracted away because she subsequently 
became dissatisfied with her attorney and now regrets the bargain 
made. 
Plaintiff's Motion brought pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) , mistake, 
inadvertence, or excusable neglect, was not filed within 3 months 
from the time the Stipulation was presented, approved by the 
parties and accepted and approved by the Court and therefore her 
Motion should have been denied. 
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As a matter of law, Plaintiff not being awarded attorney's 
fees in the lower Court is not entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees on this Appeal, Plaintiff's Appeal of the lower Court's 
ruling should be denied in all particulars. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1994. 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Neil B. Crist and Paul W. Mortensen, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 380 North 200 West, Suite 214, Bountiful, Utah 
84010 on this day of September, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A" Letter from Attorney Victor Lawrence 
dated July 27, 1993 
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VICTOR LAWRENCE 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
323 SOUTH 600 EAST, SUITE 150 
SALT LAKE CTTY, UTAH 84102 
TELEPHONE (801) 359-0600 
FAX (801) 521-5731 
July 27, 1993 
E.H. Fankhauser, Esq., 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Dautel v. Dautel 
Dear Mr. Fankhauser: 
This letter is in regard to the above-referenced matter. As stated in my last letter 
dated 07/06/93 I had contacted the court reporter, Laurie Shingle, to clarify the issue 
regarding the 40IK. 
She had told me that it would take about a week to get a transcript for me. Last 
week I called, she represented that she had mailed it on Monday. By Thursday I had still 
not received anything, she sent out another copy. Today, I received both copies, 
evidently the first one had an incorrect zip code. 
I wonft get a chance to review it now until probably Thursday afternoon or Friday 
morning. I will contact you immediately at that time to discuss this matter further. 
Please note I have enclosed a letter submitted to the Court to let them know that we 




/ Victor Lawrence 
VL/lcv / 
cc: Ms. Dautel ^ 
Enclosure (s) 
